An Indiana beneficiary's malpractice clock can start before the settlor dies, the Court of Appeals says

The trust was signed more than four years before the malpractice suit

Bobbs Sr. signed the QTIP trust on January 10, 2018. He died on May 12, 2020. His adult children, Julia Beaman and William Bobbs Jr., sued attorney F. Jefferson Crump III on February 24, 2022, alleging that the trust was invalid and that Crump had been negligent in preparing it.

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Crump. The opinion, filed October 14, 2026, held that the malpractice claim was barred by Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations.

The court found one issue dispositive. It did not decide whether the trust was valid, whether Bobbs Sr. had capacity, or whether Crump had a conflict of interest.

We read the full 16-page opinion on the Indiana courts site while preparing this piece. One trade report gave the decision date as October 16, but the clerk’s file stamp on the opinion reads October 14, 2026, so we use the date on the opinion itself.

The children knew about the trust before their father died

Bobbs Sr. and his second wife, Carolyn Janice “Jan” Bobbs, met with Crump on August 29, 2017. They wanted Jan to be able to remain at the Four Seasons retirement community if she outlived her husband. Their discussions turned to a Qualified Terminable Interest Property trust.

Crump sent an engagement letter on November 23, 2017. It described joint representation of both spouses, stated that no current conflict of interest existed, and advised them to consult independent counsel if concerns arose.

On December 9, 2017, Bobbs Sr. had lunch with Beaman and Bobbs Jr. He told them he was hiring Crump to create a QTIP trust. According to the children’s own account, as recounted in the opinion, they had never heard of a QTIP trust before that conversation.

Bobbs Jr. became suspicious and raised a possible conflict with his father, who disagreed. Bobbs Jr. also discussed the concern with lawyer friends. Beaman recorded the lunch on her phone.

The trust agreement recited that roughly $3 million had been delivered to First Financial Bank as trust property. It barred Bobbs Sr. from revoking or amending the trust. After Jan’s death, the remainder would pass to Beaman and Bobbs Jr.

The children did not ask for a copy of the trust instrument. Bobbs Jr. conceded that his father likely would have provided one.

The court distinguished a trust from a will

Indiana’s attorney malpractice limitations period is two years. Under Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4(a), the period begins when the plaintiff knows of the tortious conduct or, through ordinary diligence, could have discovered it.

The children argued that their claim did not accrue until after Bobbs Sr.’s death. They relied on Shideler v. Dwyer, an Indiana Supreme Court decision involving a negligently drafted will. In Shideler, the court held that a beneficiary’s malpractice claim accrued at the testator’s death because a will has no dispositive effect before then.

The Court of Appeals drew a line between the two instruments. A will becomes operative at death. An inter vivos trust becomes operative when it is executed, the court said, citing Ickes v. Waters.

That distinction controlled the appeal. The children knew that Bobbs Sr. had created the QTIP trust. They had concerns about it. They did not ask their father for a copy of the instrument, although Bobbs Jr. conceded he likely would have provided one. The court held that they therefore did not act with ordinary diligence.

The limitations period began on January 10, 2018, when Bobbs Sr. signed the trust. It expired two years later, in January 2020. The complaint filed in February 2022 was untimely.

What the complaint alleged, and what happened afterward

After Bobbs Sr. died, Jan fell and needed care in a more intensive unit. First Financial, acting as trustee, authorized the trust to pay the higher fees.

The complaint alleged that the trust paid Jan excessive amounts. It also alleged that Crump knew or should have known that Bobbs Sr. lacked capacity and was subject to undue influence.

Jan died on September 20, 2023. Her estate was substituted as a party and later dropped from the appeal after a settlement.

The trial court, in its July 8, 2025 order, had reasoned that the latest date on which the trust could have had a dispositive effect was the date Bobbs Sr. executed it. It also noted that the children never asked for or obtained a copy of the trust instrument.

In a footnote, the appellate court addressed a narrower theory raised in a later filing. The children said Crump drafted the trust in a way that did not reflect Bobbs Sr.’s intentions. The court said a malpractice claim on that theory also would have accrued when the trust was created and therefore was untimely.

The opinion leaves the merits questions unresolved

The court did not decide whether Crump’s drafting complied with Bobbs Sr.’s intentions. It did not decide whether Bobbs Sr. had capacity to execute the trust or whether anyone exerted undue influence. It also did not decide whether the joint representation created a conflict.

The engagement letter’s joint-representation language and independent-counsel warning appear in the factual background. The opinion does not rule on whether those provisions were adequate.

For lawyers representing prospective beneficiaries or remainder beneficiaries, the decision treats execution as the relevant date when the disputed instrument is an inter vivos trust. A beneficiary who learned about the trust before the settlor’s death and had reason to question it may face a two-year limitations period beginning on the execution date.

The court’s treatment of the missing trust copy also matters to the limitations analysis. The opinion treated the failure to request an available copy as evidence that the plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary diligence. A limitations assessment therefore turns on both what a client knew and what the client could have obtained.

The opinion carries a notice under Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E). The trial court and parties may not act in reliance on the opinion until it is certified. It is an intermediate appellate decision, and the notice makes clear that reliance on it is premature until then.

Counsel should record the trust date and the first reported concern

The practical distinction is specific. For an inter vivos trust, counsel assessing a possible malpractice claim should identify the execution date, the date the beneficiary first learned of the trust, and whether the beneficiary could have obtained the instrument. The settlor’s later death does not automatically supply the accrual date under this opinion.

A firm also has a recordkeeping issue when a relative first calls about a parent’s new trust. Archivar is an AI operating system for a law firm that answers every call 24/7 in English and Spanish, runs intake, manages matters, and remembers what the firm does. A call about whether anyone can still challenge a parent’s trust may arrive after hours, and Archivar’s intake records when the caller first raised the concern and keeps that information on the matter in English or Spanish.