The Docket · Legal History

A law from 1677 still decides which promises must be in writing.

An English statute passed against perjury, three and a half centuries ago, is the reason a court may refuse to enforce a deal you can prove was real. It sits inside every state's law today, and it still catches lawyers who forget it is there.

By Helena Harper, Editorial Director

August 6, 2026·7 min read·All facts sourced & verified. See end.
A quill pen resting on a heavy leather-bound statute book beside a pooled candle on a dark wooden desk, one warm amber light against deep green shadow.
A rule built for a courtroom where the parties themselves were not allowed to testify.

Why a 350-year-old statute is still on your desk

A client shakes hands on a deal, both sides perform for months, and then one of them walks away insisting there was never a binding contract because nothing was signed. Sometimes that argument works. The reason is a statute that predates the United States: the English Statute of Frauds, enacted in 1677. Its formal name was "An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries," and it was passed in the twenty-ninth year of Charles II, cited to this day as 29 Charles II c. 3.

The idea it introduced, that certain kinds of promise are enforceable only if there is a signed writing, is now so ordinary that most attorneys meet it as a rule with no history at all. But the history explains the rule, and it explains why the rule survives in a form the country that wrote it has mostly thrown away.

The perjury problem it was built to solve

The statute's own preamble named its target: fraudulent claims propped up "by perjury and subornation of perjury." In late-seventeenth-century England, a person could stand up in court and swear that a valuable oral bargain had been struck, and it was extraordinarily hard to rebut. The trial system of the era gave a jury thin evidentiary rules to work with. More striking to modern eyes, the parties to a lawsuit were themselves legally disqualified from testifying, on the theory that their own interest made them untrustworthy witnesses. England did not remove that disqualification until the Evidence Acts of the mid-nineteenth century.

So a defendant who had genuinely never made the promise often could not take the stand to say so. Requiring a signed writing for the transactions most worth lying about gave courts a piece of reliable evidence that a bare oath could not manufacture. The statute did not ask judges to decide who was telling the truth. It simply refused to enforce certain promises unless someone had written them down and signed.

The six kinds of promise it covered

Law students still learn the original categories through the mnemonic "MY LEGS." The letters stand for the six situations the 1677 statute pulled within its writing requirement:Marriage, promises made in consideration of marriage, such as a marriage settlement; the one-Year rule, agreements that by their terms cannot be performed within a year; Land, the sale of land or any interest in it;Executor, an executor's or administrator's promise to pay an estate's debts out of personal funds; Goods, the sale of goods above a set value, which the original act fixed at ten pounds sterling; and Suretyship, a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person.

What ties the six together is not their subject but their risk. Each is a setting where a false claim of an oral promise could do serious, hard-to-disprove damage. The statute asked for a signature precisely where the stakes and the temptation to lie ran highest.

How it crossed the Atlantic and stayed

The American colonies inherited the statute as part of English common law, and after independence the individual states carried it into their own codes. There is no single federal statute of frauds. Instead it lives in each state's law, and for the sale of goods it lives in the Uniform Commercial Code, which nearly every state has enacted. Under UCC section 2-201, a contract for the sale of goods for the price of 500 dollars or more is not enforceable, with limited exceptions, unless there is a signed writing.

That 500-dollar line has drawn fire for being frozen in an earlier economy, and reformers tried to move it. A set of amendments to UCC Article 2, approved by the uniform-law bodies in the early 2000s, would have raised the threshold to 5,000 dollars. No state adopted them, and in 2011 the sponsoring organizations formally withdrew the revised article. The 500-dollar figure remains the working rule in essentially every state.

The writing itself does not have to be a formal contract. It has to be signed by the party the plaintiff is trying to hold to the deal, the "party to be charged," and it has to show that a contract was made. Under the UCC the one term that must appear is quantity, and the agreement is enforceable only up to the quantity the writing states.

The gaps the courts left open

A rule that lets people escape real bargains on a technicality invites its own abuse, and courts have long built exceptions so the statute does not become a tool for the very fraud it was meant to prevent. Four of the most important:

Part performance

For land especially, an oral agreement can still bind if the buyer has done enough in reliance on it, typically some mix of paying, taking possession, and making improvements. Many courts will then order the sale to go through.

The merchant's confirmation

Between merchants, a signed confirmation that would bind the sender also binds the recipient, if the recipient has reason to know its contents and does not object in writing within ten days. Silence closes the gap the statute would otherwise leave open.

Specially made goods

Goods custom-built for one buyer, not suitable for resale in the ordinary course, come out from under the writing rule once the seller has made a substantial start on making or procuring them.

An admission in court

A party who admits under oath or in a pleading that a contract existed cannot then hide behind the lack of a writing, though only up to the quantity of goods admitted.

Promissory estoppel is a fifth route in many states: where one side reasonably relied on an oral promise to its detriment, some courts will enforce it despite the missing writing. Like part performance, its reach varies from state to state, which is part of why the doctrine still generates litigation.

Even England let most of it go

The country that invented the statute has largely dismantled it. The Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 repealed the writing requirement for most of the original categories, including the marriage, one-year, and executor provisions, and the separate rule for the sale of goods was cleared away as well. English law kept the writing requirement in one place from the 1677 act: guarantees, the promise to answer for another's debt, which still must be evidenced in writing. Land contracts are now governed by a modern statute, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, which goes further than the old rule and requires the contract itself to be made in writing and signed by both sides.

The criticism that drove those repeals is old. Legal scholars writing as far back as a 1916 law-review article bluntly titled "A Statute for Promoting Fraud" argued that the act, in practice, mostly handed a person a way to break a genuine promise by pointing to the absence of a signature. American law heard the same argument and, for the most part, kept the statute anyway.


The practical lesson has not changed in 350 years. A deal you can prove happened is not always a deal a court will enforce. For land, for guarantees, for goods over 500 dollars, and for anything that cannot be done within a year, the safe assumption is still the one a seventeenth-century parliament wrote down: get it in writing, and get it signed.

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The Archivar Editorial Desk

Researched and fact-checked against multiple independent sources and primary texts. General information for attorneys, not legal advice. Whether the statute of frauds applies to a given matter depends on the jurisdiction and facts.

Sources: Statute of Frauds 1677 (29 Charles II c. 3), UK legislation.gov.uk and Statutes of the Realm, vol. 5; Uniform Commercial Code section 2-201, Cornell Legal Information Institute (official text and Wex); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 129 and 139; Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 and Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, section 2, UK legislation.gov.uk; "A Statute for Promoting Fraud," Columbia Law Review, vol. 16 (1916); Barry Law Review and University of the Pacific Law Review (on the withdrawn 2003 UCC Article 2 revisions).

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